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**THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL:  
SECURITY CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

**BY**

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THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL: SECURITY CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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## ABSTRACT

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The importance of oil, its refined products and their by-products to the world is unquestionable. It is estimated that 65% of the world's oil reserves are held by the state nations surrounding the Arabian Gulf (Persian Gulf) and therefore, stability and security within the region is vital to the entire economic world. In an attempt to ensure stability and security within the region, the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council have formed an Alliance and with the assistance of external allies and coalition members have maintained the flow of oil to the international community. This essay will highlight some of the challenges facing the GCC states now and those challenges of the 21st century. It addresses measures the Gulf Cooperation Council should adopt to improve its relations with allied coalition forces in the Gulf region and recommendations of measures to be adopted in the long term.



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## THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL: SECURITY CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Security is regarded as one of the main issues challenging the Gulf Cooperation Council states. One of the most important negative aspects facing the GCC is its failure to establish real coordination to stand up collectively against perceived foreign security threats. The Persian Gulf is a strategically important body of water--home to about two-thirds of the world's oil deposits. It is fed by the two great rivers of antiquity – the Euphrates and the Tigris--and empties into the Arabian Sea through the Strait of Hormuz. Eight countries with a combined population of more than 199 million people ring the Gulf--Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman. Iran, the only non -Arab country on the Gulf, has more than 68 million people--more than all of its Gulf neighbors combined<sup>1</sup>. The states surrounding the Arabian Gulf are a primary source of oil for much of the world. In 2000 these countries produced nearly 28% of the world's oil (90% of that oil passed through the Strait of Hormuz enroute to its international destination). The US imported 23% of its oil from the Arabian Gulf in 1999 while the imports of Arabian Gulf oil for Western Europe and Japan were 50% and 74% respectively<sup>2</sup>. Oil is the lifeblood of the modern world. Oil, its refined products and their by-products are essential to modern life. All disputes within the Gulf region over the last 25 years have had an influence on the availability of oil and its price fluctuations that in turn have impacted economies around the world. Therefore, the region has strategic importance to all nations. The tanker war at the end of the Iraq/Iran War (the first Gulf war) of 1980-1988 effected restrictions on the passage of oil from the Arabian Gulf. Oil prices soared; economies suffered. Only political and military intervention eventually restored the free flow of oil from the region.

Ever since the discovery of oil in the region there have been disputes and power struggles between nations. The power struggle between Iran and Iraq resulted in some of the "smaller" Gulf States forming the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), an alliance of six Gulf States in 1981.

In order to establish what measures the GCC should adopt to improve its relations with allied or Coalition forces in the Gulf region, it is necessary to scope the question and establish the limits and the boundaries of this essay. The question establishes that this study should be limited to the ways in which the GCC states (as an Alliance) can improve its relations with allied and coalition forces in the Gulf region. Therefore, this essay will study the way in which the GCC, as a political, economic and military alliance, can improve its relations with allied or coalition forces currently based /operating in the Gulf region.

To scope the question it is necessary to identify the circumstances that led to formation of the GCC and its development from its inception to present day. A strategic analysis will baseline

the military capability of the GCC taking into account its strengths, weaknesses and opportunities against the external threats that it faces. A gap analysis will identify capability gaps between the present military capability of the GCC and its declared long-term strategic aspiration.

Allied or coalition forces based/operating in the Gulf region will be identified and the essay will establish under what auspices those forces are operating. Measures that the GCC should adopt to improve its relations with those forces will be identified, and the essay recommends measures that could be introduced in the short to medium term (within 5-10 years) and those to be introduced in the long term.

## HISTORY OF THE REGION

Historically virtually every regional power has held hegemonic rule over the Middle East and in some instances over an even wider area. Three of these empires emanated from what is now Iraq.

1. The Assyrians in 650 BC; the Babylonians in 550BC; and the Abbasids who controlled northern Africa. The Arabian Peninsula, Persia, and from the Mediterranean north to Black and Caspian seas in 850AD. From 500BC the Persian Empire controlled the western Arabian coastline as far south as Hormuz.
2. From Egypt came the Fatimids in 1000AD, the Ayyubids in 1190AD, and the Mamelukes in 1450AD.
3. The Ottoman Empire lasted from 1550 to 1918AD. The Umayyads whose empire went even further west in North Africa and east Asia than that of the Abbasids, originated in Arabia from the successors (or Khalifs) of Mohammed.
4. There were also two European conquests, those of Alexander the Great from Greece in 331 BC and the Romans in 100 AD but they did not penetrate to the Arabian Gulf.

The Point of this historical review is not to suggest that future threats will come from Egypt, Turkey or Europe but that the region has been, historically, a turbulent area. It has been invaded from every point on the compass and ruled by numerous overlords--all before the discovery of oil. Since the discovery of oil, yet another actor appeared on the scene--the United States.

## HISTORY OF THE GULF CO-OPERATION CONCIL (GCC)

The GCC is comprised of six member-states: the State of Bahrain, State of Kuwait, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the State of Qatar, the Sultanate of Oman and the United Arab Emirates. In a meeting of foreign ministers in Saudi Arabia in 1981 the idea for the GCC's

establishment was conceived. The GCC charter was signed In Abu Dabi on 25 May 1981 by the heads of its member states; thus, the GCC was born. One of the most important reasons for the creation of the GCC was "Arab changes", or to put it frankly, Arab deterioration and erosion, and the collapse of unified Arab security. While the Gulf interacted positively and spontaneously with Arab events, the collapse of adopted Arab theories from respected Arab schools of thought, was a rude awakening. Based on the belief of close-knit Arab security, the gulf was under the impression that its worries about security and stability were a collective Arab responsibility. So the view was formulated that Gulf security was Arab security.<sup>3</sup>

The objectives of the GCC, as stated in the 22 articles of its Charter,<sup>4</sup> are to effect the cooperation, integration and interconnection of member states in all areas and on all issues in order to achieve unity; to deepen and strengthen relations, links and scopes of co-operation prevailing between their peoples in various fields; to formulate similar regulations in various fields including, inter allies, economic, customs, and communications, education and culture, social and health affairs, information and tourism, and legislative and administrative affairs; to stimulate scientific and technological progress in various fields, to establish scientific research centers and implement common projects, and encourage co-operation by private sector.

The GCC charter makes no formal mention of a military alliance or military cooperation. However, some authors and I believe that the GCC Charter lists the strategic objectives of the GCC states as:<sup>5</sup>

1. To promote regional security,
2. To keep the Gulf region free from international conflicts,
3. To participate in efforts to resolve international disputes,
4. To support the UN in resolving disputes by seeking peace
5. To respect member states' national sovereignty.

Indeed, the final communiqué of the first meeting affirmed the will and the intention of the signatories to defend their security and independence and to keep the region free from international conflict.

Perhaps, the GCC Charter made no mention of a military alliance because of the political climate that prevailed before its formation. The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979, that ended the October 73 Yom-Kippur War, fragmented the Arab world. The Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 destabilized the region still further. Saudi Arabia was feeling isolated and wary of Iraq following its proposal in February 1980 for a Gulf Security Pact that essentially meant that Baghdad would protect the smaller states against Iranian pressure. Later in 1980, Iraq started the Eight-year Iraq/Iran War. The Saudi Arabian response was the formation of the GCC, a

loose association of six Gulf States. Economically and militarily the largest member, Saudi Arabia might have considered transforming the GCC into a Saudi led coalition to balance the power of Iraq and Iran. However, the GCC states became less anxious about Iraqi ambitions in the Gulf and were more fearful that Iraq would be defeated and subsequently dismembered by Iran. The GCC provided Iraq with substantial financial assistance and opened communication and transportation routes that reduced Iraq's geographical isolation.

It was during the eight years of war between Iraq and Iran that the Peninsula Shield Force ("Dara' Al-Jazirah") was established. The Peninsula Shield Force, a combined Brigade with an intended strength of about 8,000 to 10,000 men, was to be headquartered and based at a Saudi Arabian Army base in Hafar Al-Batin near the borders of Kuwait and Iraq. While the intended strength of the Peninsula Shield Force was 8 - 10,000 men there were aspirations to increase the force up to 100,000 men. The reality is that the force never exceeded 5,000 men and some reports have indicated that as few as 4,000 men made up the force since its creation.

The end of the Iraq/Iran War in 1989 heralded a short-lived peace for the GCC. Iraq's aspirations to become the leading power in the region remained unused; despite its oil reserves, agricultural and industrial potential, relatively educated population, large military forces and sense of historic destiny. Iraq failed to exert its influence beyond its borders. Syria resisted its embrace, Iran fended off its pressures, and the GCC rejected its security umbrella. Egypt continued to view itself as the leading Arab country discounting Iraq's pretensions. Following its "decisive" victory against Iran, Iraq believed that it should be acknowledged as the leading Arab Power. In May 1990 it convened an emergency Arab summit conference in Baghdad. The pretext of the conference was pan-Arab security with Iraq (joined by Jordan and the PLO) calling for a united front against aggression that would involve a new level of coordination against Israel and in support of the Intifada. The plan was to use economic pressure against the West. The GCC and Egypt balked at employing such pressure thereby challenging Iraq's leadership. A drop in oil prices (which Iraq blamed on overproduction by Kuwait and the UAE) and improving relations between Iran and several GCC member states resulted in Iraq invading Kuwait on 2 August 1990, (the start of the Second Gulf War).

The Gulf War was critically important in displaying the inability of the Arab world to contain a powerful member of its own community. The Arab countries alone had no way to compel Iraq to leave Kuwait. Iraq had the potential to dominate the Gulf Region by virtue of its control over Kuwaiti resources and its ability to hold Saudi Arabia and the remaining GCC States hostage. The Arab League was ripped apart by this conflict and was powerless to contain it. A massive foreign military presence (made up of a coalition of combat forces from 35 countries) was

required to block further aggression from Iraq. In February 1991 the defeat of Iraq resulted in the liberation of Kuwait. The GCC's Peninsula Shield Force did not participate in the Liberation of Kuwait. Following the war several GCC countries recognized their vulnerabilities and signed defense agreements with a variety of Coalition countries.

The Second Gulf War left Iran with a relative military advantage thanks to the defeat of Iraq by the Coalition. Saudi Arabia's influence over the members of the GCC was enhanced but, like the remainder of the GCC, recognized its dependence on the US and other Allies for its basic defense. Saudi Arabia was unable to act immediately to reduce its dependence on the US and other Allies as it slashed its government budget after incurring substantial debts from funding the war.

In the years that followed the Gulf War, the GCC discussed its defense and collective military capability reaching no conclusions. There were grand plans to expand the Peninsula Shield Force to 100,000 men but that never transpired.

The most definitive decisions came from a meeting of GCC Defense Ministers on 31 December 2000. The Ministers agreed that outside aggression against one GCC State would be considered as aggression against all member-states. This decision was a major step forward in the development of a GCC common defense. The defense pact sent signals to Baghdad, Tehran and all members of the international community the strength of the GCC resolve for collective security. The GCC formally adopted a three-tier defense policy and called initially for national resources to counter an initial attack on one or more states; followed by a combined GCC force; and finally, if it is deemed necessary, participation of GCC allies. The challenge now is to translate this pledge into reality and to construct a credible regional defense structure based on deterrence. The GCC defense pact also envisaged the creation of an early warning system, a Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) network, improved coordination in procurement and an increase in the size of the Peninsula Shield Force that is described as a Rapid Deployment Force. The US Ambassador to Kuwait, Mr. James Larocco, describes the aspirations as "critical building blocks that must be put in place to achieve Gulf security".<sup>6</sup>

The GCC is unlike any alliance in existence today or any alliance that existed during the last decade. It cannot be compared to military alliances such as NATO, a formal military alliance, or the former Warsaw Pact, an alliance of nations led by a single dictatorial nation. It is neither a political or trade alliance such as the European Union nor is it an alliance of nations such as the Arab League (to which all GCC states belong). The GCC is in essence a socio-economic alliance that has only recently affirmed its desire to be viewed as a credible military

alliance. The nations that make up the GCC are not democracies. Individual nations are Monarchies with only the State of Kuwait having a Nominal Constitutional Monarchy. That said, the GCC couldn't be ignored. The GCC with an indigenous population of 21 million people and a GDP of \$317.8 Billion,<sup>7</sup> as an alliance, has become a significant player in the international world. Furthermore, its control of 65 percent of the world's known oil reserves further elevates its status in the international community.

While the GCC is a stable alliance and all indications show that it has a long future, there are a number of ongoing disputes between GCC States. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have had a series of border disputes, some of which have led to shooting incidents in the contested area. Bahrain and Qatar have only recently resolved a long running dispute over several offshore islands that lay between the two-member states. Saudi Arabia, Oman and the UAE have large expanses of unmarked borders that often lead to disputes. Another problem area in the GCC has to do with its de facto leadership by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by mere virtue of its geographic size, population (75 percent of the GCC) and vast oil reserves. This causes resentment among the smaller member states, often to the point that they refuse to act in their own best interests just to block Saudi Arabia's wishes. The internal politics of the GCC are complex and difficult to predict.<sup>8</sup>

## **ALLIED/COALITION FORCES IN THE REGION**

Allied is defined as "united or joined by formal treaty", while a coalition is "a temporary combination of parties".<sup>9</sup> The coalition that participated in the Gulf War in 1990-91 was made up of 35 countries; an unprecedented alliance brought together under the umbrella of several United Nations Security Council Resolutions intended to liberate Kuwait. In the wake of the Gulf War several GCC countries signed bilateral defense treaties with members of the coalition.

Since the liberation of Kuwait several other Security Council Resolutions have been passed that have required Coalition forces to remain in the Gulf Region. Over the last 10 years the Coalition has disintegrated following the apparent failure of United Nations sanctions. In the Arab nations view, the sanctions are hurting innocent civilians and not damaging the political regime in Iraq. In addition, the Arab world views the implementation of sanctions against Iraq as yet another form of US colonialism and is disenchanted by the continued US military presence in the area. This view is encouraged the US stance in relation to the on-going dispute between the Palestinians and Israelis. Consequently, the only nations who are actively implementing the United Nations imposed Southern No-Fly Zone are the USA and the UK as part of the Joint Task Force South West Asia.

The US and the UK once again lead the implementation of the United Nations maritime embargo against Iraq although there are several other Coalition nations who assist from time to time.

### **THE SECURITY PROBLEM**

The problem in the Gulf is complicated further by the existence of the doubt and distrust prevalent in the region. The GCC countries fear that contentious issues might crop up based on border disputes and its changing relationships with both Iran and Iraq. Differences could very likely flare up between states in the region in the absence of the Western security umbrella or even in the event that Western military presence is reduced. There is also the possibility that Iran and Iraq might return to play a main role in the region's politics once the international sanctions imposed on Iraq are lifted and Iranian-Western relations, especially with the United States, improve.

Since the liberation of Kuwait, the failure of the concept of Arab national security and the weak military preparedness of the Gulf States has forced the GCC countries to reach the conclusion that a necessity exists for entering into agreements and security links with Western countries, particularly the United States. There is nothing strange about the Gulf States' concern with internal security problems.

Writer Mohammed Al-Said Idris has said that the Gulf Cooperation Council members do not have a specific single vision of the concept of security or the sources of threat since security policies center on specific joint commitments. There was a security situation based on "self security" and independent military strength for each state separately with the intention of eventual coordination and cooperation. The most important features of this security situation mentioned by Al-Said Idris are as follows:

1. Concentration on the military concept which means focusing on military capability alone to maintain security without taking into account a collective school which views security as multidimensional; namely-- military, economic, social, and cultural.
2. Differences over the sources of threat and their order of priority of these. The Gulf States views differed on the source on the threat in 1970s. Some believed it meant security for the oil, while others said radical movements such as the Pan-Arab movement in Iraq to the north and Yemen to the south. A third group believed the threat comes from Islamic revolution in Iran after the appearance of the idea of exporting the revolution.

3. Deepening the subordination to foreign countries means increased dependence by the Gulf States on the West for the supply of arms, experts and continually needed spare parts.<sup>10</sup>

Table no.1, field study conducted by Al-Said Idris on the political views of the Kuwaiti elite following the defeat of Iraq, 309 people were asked about their opinions regarding security in the Gulf after this invasion.

No.	How do you view Gulf Security	Number	Percentage
1	Attached to GCC only	74	24%
2	GCC + Arab States	35	11.3%
3	GCC + Western States	11	35.6%
4	GCC + Iran + Turkey + Pakistan	60	19.4%
5	All above powers	5	1.6%
6	Other Power	12	3.9%
7	No Answer	10	3.2%
8	No available	3	1.0%
	Total	309	100%

TABLE 1 GULF SECURITY AND ITS LINKS WITH REGIONAL POWER

It is clear from the above table that the majority of field-study participants in Kuwait (35.6 percent) prefer an alliance with the west rather than the Gulf Cooperation Council (24 percent) or the Arab countries (11.3 percent). The frustration of Kuwaiti citizens arose from the ineffective nature of Arab collective security at the time Iraq attacked Kuwait. The Kuwaiti elite also feels that the Gulf Cooperation Council states alone could not achieve regional security. Those of the elite polled rejected the concept of regional security and believe the alliance with the West was more effective than that with Arabs or other Islamic countries in the region.

#### STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

Table no.2,<sup>11</sup> gives details of the military capability of individual GCC states. The assessment of GCC strengths and weaknesses is made on the combined military strength of the alliance. The GCC three-tier defense policy supports this methodology; however it must be understood that if the military strength of Saudi Arabia is, for whatever reason, not committed to the combined GCC military strength the following assessment will be significantly different.

	Bahrain	KSA	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	UAE	TOTAL
Armed Bdes	1	3	2	1	0	1	8
Inf Bde/Mech Inf Bde	1	6	2	3	1	5	18
Arty Bde	1	1	1	1	0	1	5
MBT	106	715	324	97	34	231	1507
AIFV	25	970	355	0	40	430	1820

APC	120	1850	100	73	160	570	<b>2873</b>
Self Propelled Arty	13	200	41	18	28	175	<b>475</b>
Multi Rocket Launcher	9	60	27	0	0	66	<b>162</b>
Frigate	1	8	0	0	0	2	<b>11</b>
Corvette	2	0	0	2	0	2	<b>6</b>
Fast Attack Craft	4	29	6	4	3	8	<b>54</b>
Amphibious Vessel	0	4	0	2	1	5	<b>12</b>
Submarine (SSK)	0	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
Mine Counter Measures	0	6	0	0	0	0	<b>6</b>
Fighter Ground Attack	12	160	36	24	9	43	<b>284</b>
Fighter Aircraft	12	191	20	0	9	22	<b>254</b>
Transport Aircraft	3	49	4	36	6	22	<b>120</b>
Airborne Early Warning	0	5	0	0	0	0	<b>5</b>
Attack Helicopter	14	12	16	0	18	44	<b>104</b>
Transport Helicopter	19	74	12	31	6	45	<b>187</b>

TABLE 2 GCC MILITARY CAPABILITIES

#### STRENGTHS

The GCC has significant military capability. In general, it is equipped with modern high-tech hardware from a variety of vendors around the world. GCC Land Forces can muster in excess of 30 Brigades with over 1500 Main Battle Tanks and double that number of Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle and Armored Personnel Carriers. In addition, Saudi Arabia has a significant reserve of Main Battle Tanks. GCC air power is characterized by highly capable UK, US and French combat aircraft with integrated weapon and sensor systems. The five Saudi E3-A AEW aircraft gives the GCC a significant advantage over any potential regional adversary.

#### WEAKNESS

While the array of GCC military hardware is impressive, the number of different suppliers (companies and nations) results in major difficulties in the integration of similar weapon and sensor systems in all three environments. In many cases, the cost of integration is prohibitive and therefore is not economically viable. One major weakness highlighted is the lack of ability to deploy its forces within the region dictating a total reliance on commercially contracted land, sea and air transport. While this shortfall may not appear to be immediately apparent or significant, the limited availability of road transports dictated the build up of Allied and Coalition forces during the Second Gulf War. A review of the maritime environment shows other GCC shortfalls

in a number of vital areas. The GCC has an extensive coastline and all of the states rely on sea trade for exporting and importing goods. The GCC has a limited Mine Countermeasures capability and in the past has relied on its Allies and Coalition forces to ensure free sea passage within the region. In addition, the GCC has a very limited Anti-Submarine Warfare capability which is surprising given the fact that Iran possesses three operational "Kilo" class conventional submarines and a number of mini-submarines.

## THREAT

The threat to the GCC comes from its largest neighbors Iran and Iraq. The USA<sup>12</sup> and the UK support this view. Table no. 3,<sup>13</sup>

	Iran	Iraq (100% Combat Effectiveness)	Iraq (60% Combat Effectiveness)
Armd Bdes	14	14	8
Inf Bde/Mech Inf Bde	44	64	38
Arty Bde	10	6	4
MBT	1400	2700	1620
AIFV	440	900	540
APC	610	2000	1200
Self Propelled Arty	580	150	90
Multi Rocket Launcher	1524	150	90
Frigate	3	2	1
Corvette	2	0	0
Fast Attack Craft	21	1	1
Amphibious Vessel	9	0	0
Submarine (SSK)	3	0	0
Mine Counter Measures	5	4	2
Fighter Ground Attack	150	130	78
Fighter Aircraft	114	180	108
Transport Aircraft	85	65	39
Airborne Early Warning	3	0	0
Attack Helicopter	100	120	72
Transport Helicopter	452	350	210

TABLE 3 THREAT MILITARY CAPABILITIES

The above table3 gives details of the military capability of Iran and Iraq. It should be noted that Iran has been subjected to more than a decade of sanctions that have resulted in major shortages of spare parts for the majority of its "Western" military equipment. It is not possible to assess the true combat capability/power of Iran and therefore it is recorded as per the source data. Iraq's combat effectiveness is reported to be at 50 percent (with the exception of the Republican Guard) and 50 percent of remaining equipment lacks spare parts. Some sources assess Iraqi combat effectiveness at an overall figure of 60 percent--that figure has

been used in the assessment of Iraqi military capability. It is acknowledged that such a coarse measure of military capability can be misleading and that the potential exists for the Iraqi military to be fully manned with equipment availability/serviceability as low as 60 percent.

## GAP ANALYSIS

### GCC-V-IRAN

Table 4,<sup>14</sup> is a comparison of the military strength of the GCC in relation to the armed forces of Iran. The gap column shows the difference in military strength taken from Table 1 and Table 2; a negative figure indicates a GCC numerical deficit in the respective area.

	GCC	Iran	Gap*
Armd Bdes	8	14	-6
Inf Bde/Mech Inf Bde	18	44	-26
Arty Bde	5	10	-5
MBT	1507	1400	107
AIFV	1820	440	1380
APC	2873	610	2263
Self Propelled Arty	475	580	-105
Multi Rocket Launcher	162	1524	-1362
<hr/>			
Frigate	11	3	8
Corvette	6	2	4
Fast Attack Craft	54	21	33
Amphibious Vessel	12	9	3
Submarine (SSK)	0	3	-3
Mine Counter Measures	6	5	1
<hr/>			
Fighter Ground Attack	284	150	134
Fighter Aircraft	254	114	140
Transport Aircraft	120	85	35
Airborne Early Warning	5	3	2
Attack Helicopter	104	100	4
Transport Helicopter	187	452	-265

TABLE 4 GAP ANALYSIS GCC-V-IRAN

A study of Table 3 indicates that the combined strength of the GCC is superior to that of Iran in all but the following areas:

### ARMY BRIGADE NUMBERS.

Iran has the ability to muster 37 Brigades (Armoured, Armoured Infantry and Infantry) more than the combined strength of the GCC. This numerical superiority is significant as it goes a long way in countering the GCC's numerical superiority in Main Battle Tanks and other armoured vehicles.

## ARMY EQUIPMENT

Iran's military equipment has major serviceability problems and there is an overall shortage of spare parts for equipment manufactured in the West resulting from international sanctions. Detailed examination of the Iranian inventory shows that Iranian equipment is, on the whole, inferior to that operated by the GCC. Nonetheless, the numerical advantage of Iran's self-propelled artillery and multi rocket launchers gives Iran a tactical advantage in this area.

## SUBMARINES

Iran operates three Kilo class submarines. The serviceability of the submarines is questionable but they do form a real threat to the GCC and freedom of movement through the Strait of Hormuz. The GCC has a limited anti submarine capability and therefore are vulnerable to the effects of Iranian submarines.

## MINE COUNTER MEASURES.

It has already been identified that the GCC has a significant gap in its mine counter measures capability. Iran possesses thousands of sea mines that can be laid by most ships in its inventory. During the Iran/Iraq War, mines caused considerable damage to civilian vessels and it took international action to restore the safe passage of ships in and out of the Arabian Gulf.

## TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS.

Iran has a considerable numerical superiority in its number of transport helicopters. However, their tactical significance is assessed as limited.

The combined strength of the GCC is tactically greater in the air and at sea. On the land, Iran has a significant advantage in the number of Brigades it can field which reduces or even negates the GCC's tactical advantage in the number of its tanks and other armoured vehicles.

GCC military forces do not have a unified command headquarters or command structure. This could severely restrict their operational capability in the event of a conflict with Iran in coming years. Conversely, Iran does have a functioning command and control structure with a single political master. The GCC must establish a military headquarters and agreed command structure if it expects to fight as a co-ordinated and cohesive force.

## GCC -V- IRAQ

Table 5,<sup>15</sup> is a comparison of the military strength of the GCC in relation to the armed forces of Iraq at 60 percent combat effectiveness. The gap column shows the difference in

military strength taken from Table 1 and Table 2; a negative figure indicates a GCC numerical deficit in the respective area.

	GCC	Iraq	Gap*
Armd BDEs	8	8	0
INF Bde/Mech INF BDE	18	38	-20
Arty BDE	5	4	1
MBT	1507	1620	-113
AIFV	1820	540	1280
APC	2873	1200	1673
Self Propelled Arty	475	90	385
Multi Rocket Launcher	162	90	72
Frigate	11	1	10
Corvette	6	0	6
Fast Attack Craft	54	1	53
Amphibious Vessel	12	0	12
Submarine (SSK)	0	0	0
Mine Counter Measures	6	2	4
Fighter Ground Attack	284	78	206
Fighter Aircraft	254	108	146
Transport Aircraft	120	39	81
Airborne Early Warning	5	0	5
Attack Helicopter	104	72	32
Transport Helicopter	187	210	-23

TABLE 5 GAP ANALYSIS GCC-V-IRAQ (AT 60% COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS)

A study of Table 3 indicates that the combined strength of the GCC is superior to that of Iraq in almost all areas. The UN sanctions following the Gulf War have reduced the military capability of Iraq. Nonetheless, Iraq can mobilize 20 Infantry/Mechanised Infantry Brigades more than the GCC giving Iraq a significant numerical advantage. The Iraqi numerical tank advantage is considered irrelevant given the superior capability of GCC Main Battle Tanks. Iraq has no other significant numerical advantage over the GCC military capability.

It is worth viewing the command and control arrangements of the Iraqi military machine. As with Iran, Iraq has a functioning well-rehearsed command and control structure with a single commander. Despite repeated allied air strikes against Iraqi air defence command and control targets, Iraq appears to have built considerable redundancy into its networks and the overall effect of the strikes is assessed by some as minimal. Iraqi command and control capability should not be dismissed; it gives Iraq an advantage.

Iraq is currently viewed as the main threat to the GCC. Iraq can field a numerically superior force in terms of personnel but its equipment is less sophisticated than that of the GCC and is in a poor state of repair. In all other areas the GCC has a superior military capability.

## DECEMBER 2000 DEFENCE PACT – GCC IMPROVEMENTS

### NON - AGGRESSION PACT

As previously stated, the non-aggression pact is a major step forward in the development of a common GCC defence. The three-tier approach is logical and defence pacts between member states and its allies support the third tier. However, the analysis of the threats to the GCC highlights that an individual state is incapable of resisting a concerted attack by Iran or Iraq and therefore the second tier defence would require the rapid deployment of GCC forces to deter and repulse any attack.

While the non-aggression pact is in essence a paperwork exercise confirming what is implied in the GCC Charter, it clarifies the role that the GCC expects its allies to take in the event of an attack. It is understood that in the event of a surprise attack it will take time to mobilize and deploy allied forces into the region. However, given the extent of surveillance and intelligence gathering operations in the region it is considered unlikely that Iran or Iraq could mount a concerted surprise attack on the GCC.

### C4I - NETWORK.

Work on a GCC C4I network commenced in August 1998. The Hizam Al Taawun (belt of cooperation) program builds on the member states efforts since the Second Gulf War to bolster their co-operative defense capabilities. The program involves constructing new facilities as well as refurbishing existing ones. The Hizam Al Taawun is a distributed C4I network that allows GCC states to jointly identify, track and monitor aircraft in the airspace over and surrounding their territories. The system which tracks several hundred aircraft in real time feeds into national air defense systems thereby permitting better coordination of defensive activities.

The Hizam Al Taawun was commissioned on 27 February 2001. The system provides the tools and facilities (in Arabic and in English) that allow improved military-to-military planning and coordination. The system relies upon data being passed between national operation centers along an encrypted high-speed fiber optic network that stretches from Oman to Kuwait (this network was provided by a related "Communications Project" program). The total cost of the Hizam Al Taawun and the Communications Project was in excess of \$160 Million and is the largest set of military contracts awarded by the GCC.

The successful completion of the Hizam Al Taawun system is the first step in an integrated GCC C4I network. The system is designed to incorporate technology upgrades and supports expansion. The system's architecture permits third parties to input data and to share selected data in the system. The in-built interoperability of the system allows land, air and sea based sensors to be fused thus providing an integrated system with growth potential.

The introduction of the Hizam Al Taawun system will have an effect on the allies. Its presence reduces the number of allied sensors and personnel that need to be forward based in the region. Given the pressure on the allies to reduce overseas commitments, the Hizam Al Taawun system will improve relations between the GCC and its allies.

#### EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS.

In 1998 the then US Secretary of Defense, Mr William Cohen, raised the idea of a missile defense capability in the Arabian Gulf region—the Cooperative Defense Initiative. The Cooperative Defense Initiative would include shared early warning active and passive defenses to deal with the consequences of a chemical or biological attack. The driver for such a system is the development and proliferation of missile technology within the region, noticeably by Iran and Iraq.

There has been considerable debate regarding the Cooperative Defense Initiative proposal. The consensus has been that the system is too costly, and therefore, the GCC has not developed the concept further. During his final visit to the region in January 2000, Mr Cohen stated that "this [the Cooperative Defense Initiative] does not include expensive equipment". The early warning element of the system would alert GCC states about signs of missile launch detected by satellite almost instantaneously through classified computer links and would then track the missiles. Mr Cohen went on to say "installing the system would mainly involve software upgrades and intelligence collection". He concluded by stating that "each country will approach it (Cooperative Defense Initiative) differently, but my goal is to at least warn countries in the region to the nature of the threat and to explore ways in which our militaries can share information, share intelligence, share ways in which the threat can be deterred or minimized should it ever occur".<sup>16</sup> Political commentators have questioned the true intentions of the USA and its Cooperative Defense Initiative. Shortly after Mr Cohen made his remarks the Gulf News Daily questioned his motives in an editorial asking "Does Cohen really have the interests of the Gulf in mind or is he trying to drum up more business for America's arms industry by putting fear into the Arabs?"<sup>17</sup> This view is shared by several GCC states. Some authors concluded, "The

threat of punishment (a retaliatory missile strike) by offensive means is still viewed by many GCC military planners as a critical component of deterrence planning".<sup>18</sup>

The introduction of the Cooperative Defense Initiative, or a similar system, would provide early warning and potential protection to the states of the GCC and any allied troops based there. It is considered that the introduction of a GCC wide early warning system is unlikely to be implemented in the near future due to its cost and the impact of such a system on the fledgling relationships being forged by some GCC member states and Iran.

### **IMPROVED CO-ORDINATION IN PROCUREMENT**

Commonality in defense procurement has been an aspiration that has eluded every modern democratic military alliance. Throughout the 50 years of NATO's existence, a standard for something as simple as small bore ammunition has never been agreed upon; yet arguably, the alliance has been successful.

The strategic analysis of GCC military capability identified that one of the weaknesses of the GCC was the diverse nature of its military equipment. Procurement of equipment has been on a state-by-state basis and has been inextricably linked to the individual political policies and strategic objectives of each member state. Examining recent military acquisitions by the state of Kuwait reveals this: US Fighters and Main Battle Tanks, UK Training Aircraft and Armored Fighting Vehicles, Russian Multi-Barreled Rocket Launchers, Chinese Self-Propelled Guns and French Fast Patrol Craft. It is clearly a Kuwaiti policy to covet favor with the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council by using defense procurement as a political tool. The remaining states of the GCC adopted similar policies.

While a unified GCC procurement process is unlikely, greater cooperation in the procurement of military equipment is a realistic aspiration. Greater cooperation is unlikely to stop duplication of capability within the GCC, but it has the potential to save money and will certainly enable greater interoperability within the GCC and between the GCC and its allies.

The Arabian Gulf region is a lucrative market for the international armaments industry. In 1999, defense expenditure, in relation to GDP, within the GCC ranged from 5.2 – 12 percent; the total defense expenditure was \$32.12 Billion<sup>19</sup> (this equates to over 10% of the combined GDP of the GCC). This figure represents 54 percent of recorded worldwide armament sales in 1999. From the end of the Second Gulf War in 1991 until 1997 in excess of \$300 Billion worth of armaments had been procured by the member states of the GCC. With its combined spending might, greater co-operation in procurement by the GCC could influence the international arms industry.

It is believed by some that GCC states have procured military equipment because it was new cutting-edge technology. Equipment was invariably procured without a long-term in-service support package, and this has led to prolonged unserviceable ability and increased overall support costs.

It is unclear how the GCC intends to pursue its desire for greater co-operation. However, a study of the recent changes to the UK procurement system ("Smart Procurement") highlights many areas from which the GCC could benefit.

## DEFENSE STANDARDS

NATO realized that common defense procurement was an unachievable aspiration and therefore adopted a common set of standards that covered the full spectrum of military operations. It includes computer and communication protocols; common labeling of fuels, oils, lubricants and other disposable items; common connectors for communication equipment and power appliances; fuel and the use of a single language when on operations or exercises

The adoption of the Defense Standards ensures that while NATO equipment is procured from a variety of vendors (including Russian equipment) it can operate alongside and with other NATO members. The US defense has adopted more stringent Defense Standards that ensure greater intra and inter service interoperability. If the GCC were to adopt the simple philosophy of procuring a capability, making maximum use of commercial off-the-shelf technology, and plan/provision for it through life support, GCC member states would achieve much higher serviceability rates of their equipment and realize significant savings. In addition, if the GCC were to adopt a common set of standards, akin to that of NATO, greater interoperability would be achieved between GCC states. Furthermore, if NATO or US Standards were the basis of those adopted by the GCC the result would be improved interoperability between the GCC and its allies. In turn the GCC states could offer increased support to the allies in the event of deployment into the region on operations or exercises. Increased host nation support will reduce the need to deploy large quantities of support equipment and material. It therefore follows that improved interoperability, resulting from the adoption of Defense Standards, will improve relations between the GCC and its allies.

## USA DEFENSE PROCUREMENT TRENDS

Joint Vision 2020<sup>20</sup> was produced by the Joint Doctrine Staff of the Pentagon and states how the USA intends to achieve its vision of Full Spectrum Dominance in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. The USA intends to continue to invest heavily in research and development of new technologies and to introduce them into service at the earliest opportunity. It is considered that new technology

will reduce the need to expose the human to the full risks of war, a matter that has great importance to the US. It is expected that such a policy carries a consequential price tag but the long-term goal is to reduce battlefield collateral while achieving Full Spectrum Dominance. This is a trend that the GCC is unlikely to follow.

It would be radical to think that the GCC would adopt a procurement process like the UK's "Smart Procurement" system. However, it is recognized that the adoption of some of its fundamental principles and philosophies would produce significant life-long savings to the states of the GCC and improve interoperability. Furthermore, the introduction of a set of common GCC procurement standards would improve interoperability within the GCC and potentially with its allies. The cost of developing and introducing a set of procurement standards is relatively small. While there will be cost involved in manufacturing equipment to meet the proposed standards, the potential savings in the long term will offset initial costs. Given the level of GCC expenditure on equipment from the US and NATO countries, the cost to manufacture equipment to GCC defense standards, if modeled on those of the USA and the NATO countries, would be minimal.

The introduction of some "Smart Procurement" philosophies and a common set of GCC Defense Standards could be achieved in the short term. Initial costs are small but the long term savings and interoperability benefits are assessed as significant. Furthermore, the GCC's relationship with its allies will be improved.

#### INCREASED PENINSULA SHIELD FORCE

The Peninsula Shield Force is considered by many as a token force. Initial aspirations were for a Brigade sized force of some 10,000 men based in Hafr Al-Baten in Saudi Arabia. The reality has been that a force of no more than 5,000 men has been available following its establishment in 1986. The Peninsula Shield Force is viewed by many as little more than a token force. It did not participate in the Gulf War, and it took no active part in Operation Desert Fox in 1998.

At the meeting of Defense Ministers in December 2000, it was stated that the Peninsula Shield Force should be increased by four times to a force of 20,000. It is envisaged that the new force would take on the role of a Joint defense force capable of deploying troops and equipment to a crisis area within the GCC on short notice until troops from other states could be deployed.

In theory a larger Peninsula Shield Force with a credible rapid deployment capability would reduce the number of allied forces deployed in theatre. However, given the current problems facing all the GCC states in recruiting and training high caliber troops there is little chance that these states will commit troops to a large standing force based in Saudi Arabia. The

GCC may wish to consider identifying national troops that are on a high state of readiness who could form the GCC Rapid Deployment Force along the lines of the allied Joint Rapid Reaction Force

## INTEROPERABILITY

It has been seen that interoperability between the members of the GCC and between the GCC and its allies is essential.

Colonel S. A. Hug, Deputy Chief of the Defense Staff, Canadian Armed Forces, defines interoperability as "The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to or accept services from other forces to enable them to operate effectively together. Many facets such as doctrine, organizations, weapons, and equipment impact on the interoperability of forces. Interoperability creates the conditions to achieve unity of effort and to simplify planning and execution in alliance or coalition operations." Interoperability is required at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.<sup>21</sup>

The Canadian Armed Forces have deduced that there is a greater requirement for interoperability, at all levels, than historically envisioned. This finding is due entirely to CAF involvement with its allies, coalition forces and other international organizations the same can be said for the GCC. The third tier of the defense of the GCC relies on its allies and operating with them in a credible and safe manner. The achievement of interoperability will significantly improve relations between the GCC and its allies. However, the path to true interoperability is complex and costly and will require agreement at political and military level.

NATO's Partnership for Peace allies are instructed that the essential areas for interoperability include: the ability to communicate effectively (to include language, procedures and terminology, command and control arrangements) and the understanding of alliance military doctrine, standards and procedures.<sup>22</sup> NATO states that the following areas have priority in the Partnership for Peace Training and Education Enhancement Program: language training (at operational and tactical levels), the practice of staff procedures, command and control procedures, understanding alliance doctrine and standards and the training of staff officers and Non-Commissioned Officers.

The Canadian view of interoperability identifies that there are many facets that lead to true interoperability. Likewise, the NATO teaching to its Partnership for Peace allies identifies the same facets and expands on them. The facets and their relevance to the GCC and its relationship with its allies will be examined in turn.

## DOCTRINE

British Defense Doctrine expresses the importance of doctrine as "sound doctrine provides a common approach and way of thinking, which is not bound by perspective rule. This will lead through training to consistent behavior, mutual confidence and properly orchestrated collective action, without constraining individual initiative".<sup>23</sup> While individual GCC states are developing national doctrine, there is no GCC doctrine and given the importance of the 3-tier defense policy, it is a major shortfall that needs to be addressed with urgency. Given the nature of the GCC as a military alliance and the fact that it has taken nearly 20 years, and the Gulf War, for the GCC to sign a defense pact it can be assumed that any GCC doctrine will take several years to develop and to ratify. Therefore, it is unlikely that any GCC doctrine will be introduced in the near future. The lack of an agreed doctrine presents the GCC with a number of challenges in order to achieve a common approach and unity of effort that, in the short term, can only be overcome by joint training and exercises. The lack of doctrine presents further problems when the GCC is operating with the coalition. Within NATO, the US and the other member countries have agreed that national doctrine should be consistent with NATO doctrine so that when operating in a multi-national NATO force national doctrine is the same or similar to that of the multi-national force and the requirement for pre-deployment training is reduced. This approach ensures that NATO has the ability to rapidly deploy a credible and cohesive force into a theatre of operations as occurred in Macedonia recently. The GCC should, as a matter of urgency, develop a combined military doctrine to engender mutual confidence and, where possible, ensure economy of effort between the GCC and the GCC and its allies.

## ORGANIZATIONS

It is important that the individual organizations that make up the collective military strength of the GCC function in a cohesive and coordinated manner. Given the GCC's reliance on collective security (intra GCC and the GCC and its allies) as the cornerstone of its defense policy--this is even more relevant. The individual GCC states have established military command and control hierarchies that ultimately report to the monarch of each member state. Unlike NATO, there is no established GCC military headquarters. In the event of a crisis there is no central headquarters where its development can be monitored and military actions can be planned and executed. The GCC should consider establishing a permanent Joint Military Headquarters.

## PRACTICE OF STAFF PROCEDURES

Given that there is no established GCC military headquarters; there is no opportunity to practice staff procedures in the GCC environment. National procedures are practiced occasionally, but there is no information available to indicate that a large-scale GCC exercise for the practice of staff procedures has ever taken place. Joint GCC staff procedures can be developed once the GCC has ratified its doctrine. Rehearsed staff procedures improve the speed at which a headquarters can assimilate information, make decisions and disseminate orders to subordinate commanders. It is this speed of action that is the key to achieving the element of surprise (one of the Principles of War) and maintaining tempo, a vital component in maneuvers-warfare. It can be seen that without a common doctrine, the GCC will not be able to develop staff procedures that will be vital to the successful operation of its military headquarters. Until a joint GCC doctrine is developed the GCC will be forced to rely on the staff procedures of its allies. This is evident in viewing the Headquarters of the Joint Task Force Southwest Asia; the command organization responsible for implementing the UN imposed No-Fly-Zone over southern Iraq.

## COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS

The Hizam Al Taawun (HAT) program is the foundation on which the GCC intends to develop its C4I network. While the aircraft tracking system is now operational, further work to develop the network has stalled due to escalating costs. However, having the hardware in place to facilitate command and control is only a part of a cohesive C4I network that can function smoothly in the fog of war. Any command and control system must have the facility to enable allied forces to integrate it in the event of additional allied forces deploying into the area in response to a crisis. As discussed previously a joint doctrine and practiced staff procedures are required if the command and control system is to function correctly. The final element in any functioning military command organization is trained personnel--staff officers and non-commissioned officers.

## TRAINING OF STAFF OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS

Training within any organization is important, but to the military it is vital and the key to success. The most up-to-date equipment in the world is useless if personnel are not trained to operate and maintain that equipment. The need to train staff officers and non-commissioned officers to support military commanders is critical if military force is to be efficiently employed.

## STAFF OFFICER TRAINING

There are several national colleges that train staff officers within the GCC but available data on them is extremely limited. Kuwait has developed a Joint Command and Staff College training staff officers at the Staff Officer 1 and 2 levels. The course is multi-national, and instruction is in English. The syllabus is similar to that at the UK Joint Command and Staff College and is based on UK doctrine and staff procedures. The College provides a good template for a combined GCC Joint Command and Staff College. The establishment of a combined GCC Joint Command and Staff College would be a major step along the road of interoperability but it is a complex matter. It is believed that it will not occur in the short term. A logical progression from the development of a GCC doctrine, the ratification of joint staff procedures (and a GCC military headquarters) and finally the formation of a combined GCC Joint Command and Staff College is less radical but will take several years to come to fruition. At this time the training of junior staff officers should remain a national responsibility. As has been previously stated, common GCC staff training, doctrine and staff procedures will improve relations between the GCC and its allies.

## NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER TRAINING

There is little data available on the training of non-commissioned officers within the GCC. However, the author does not support the formation of a combined GCC non-commissioned officer training facility. Nonetheless, it is vital that all GCC non-commissioned officers are trained to similar level and therefore co-ordination at national level is required.

## WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

The importance of interoperability in weapons and equipment has been examined previously in this essay. Improved interoperability in this area will undoubtedly improve relations between the GCC and its allies.

## LANGUAGE

The GCC countries share a common language that gives it a significant advantage over many other alliances. When operating together the GCC members can communicate clearly; however, the same cannot be said when the GCC operates with its allies. Arabic is a complex language to learn and few westerners are skilled enough to converse in it at the operational or tactical levels. It would be impractical to require every member of the GCC military to speak English, and it would be impractical for the allied military to learn Arabic. There is, however, a

number of key posts that must be filled by bilingual personnel, and these posts should be identified, and personnel should be trained to fill these positions.

## CONCLUSIONS

The GCC is a socio-economic alliance that has only recently developed into a fledgling military alliance. The majority of the world's known oil reserves are to be found in the states surrounding the Arabian Gulf. Therefore, the region has strategic significance to the entire world.

The history of the GCC has been turbulent with the most noticeable event being the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, (the Gulf War). It was the Gulf War that showed that the GCC was incapable of repelling the Iraqi forces from Kuwait without the assistance of an unprecedented 35-nation coalition formed under the auspices of a number of United Nations Security Council Resolutions. Indeed, it took several weeks for the GCC to unanimously request assistance and the GCC's standing force (the Peninsula Shield Force) did not participate in the liberation of Kuwait. Following the Gulf War additional UN Security Council Resolutions required that coalition and allied forces remain in the area. Today the UN Security Council Resolutions are imposed by forces from the US and the UK. It is these countries that this essay refers to as Allied (Allies) or Coalition Forces, and it is to these countries that this essay has examined the measures that the GCC should adopt in order to improve its relations.

Despite the stark reality of the military vulnerability of the GCC it took 10 years after the liberation of Kuwait for its Defense Ministers to make the most definitive decisions in the history of the GCC. In December 2000, they signed a defense pact that formalized a three-tier defense policy for the alliance. In addition, they made several statements that indicated the way ahead for the military alliance. This essay has examined the three-tier defense policy, and the developments suggested by the GCC Defense Ministers in order to establish whether they will improve relations between the GCC and the allies.

The affirmation of the three-tier defense policy does little more than confirm the fact that the allies will be asked to support the GCC if it is assessed that the combined military strength of the GCC cannot repel any attack on one, or more, member states. It is considered that the formal acceptance of this policy clarifies the position and responsibilities of the allies and therefore improves relations between the GCC and its allies.

A strategic analysis of the GCC established that it is, as a combined force, a credible military machine that is equipped with modern and capable weapon systems. Nonetheless, several capability gaps were identified and recommendations have been made to fill those gaps.

By filling the gaps the GCC will reduce the reliance on the allies to base personnel and equipment in the area. Given the pressures on the governments by the US to reduce the number of its troops deployed "out-of-area" this will improve relations between the GCC and the allies.

A gap analysis was conducted to establish whether the combined military strength of the GCC could defeat the forces of the two countries believed to pose the greatest threat to the GCC--Iran and Iraq. It was considered that the combined strength of the GCC could defeat an attack by Iraq; however, Iraq could amass a numerically superior force compared to that of the GCC and that poses a significant threat. In viewing Iran's military capability it is clear that the GCC could defeat Iran in the air and at sea but on the land the sheer number of Iranian military personnel at its disposal reduces or even negates the numerical superiority of the GCC in relation to tanks and other armored vehicles. It can be concluded that if Iran were to mount a concerted attack on the GCC or one of its members; allied forces would be required to augment the forces of the GCC to repel the attack. In the case of Iraq the situation is more finely balanced. Iraq's superiority in numbers of personnel must be considered against the assessed condition and availability of equipment following the Second Gulf War and the ensuing UN sanctions. If the GCC could react quickly to Iraqi aggression, it has the combined might to repulse an attack. However, the lack of GCC military headquarters, staff procedures and an overarching doctrine suggests that a unanimous decision to mobilize forces will take some time.

The December 2000 Defense Pact indicated several avenues that the GCC military would pursue in the future. This essay examined each suggestion in detail and, with the exception of the expansion of the Peninsula Shield Force, deduced that each would improve relations between the GCC and the allies. Each suggestion would improve interoperability between the GCC states and between the GCC and the allies. This in turn would reduce the requirement for allied equipment and personnel to be based in the region.

The proposed expansion of the Peninsula Shield Force is considered an unrealistic aspiration given the current difficulties facing all GCC states recruiting and training high caliber personnel for the armed forces. The author does make a recommendation on how the GCC may wish to consider an alternative method of overcoming the problem.

The remaining avenues suggested by GCC Defense Ministers in December 2000 all lead to improved interoperability between member states and the GCC and its allies. Any improvement between the GCC and its allies will reduce the requirement to base the current levels of equipment and personnel in the region. This will undoubtedly improve relations between the GCC and its allies. However, it is believed that the GCC recommendations do not

go far enough and therefore interoperability was examined in greater detail to establish what additional changes the GCC should make to achieve true interoperability.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

My recommendations that the GCC countries should consider the following areas for implementation in the short to medium term (5 – 10 years):

1. The GCC should introduce a Joint Military Doctrine.
2. The GCC should introduce a common set of Defense Standards.
3. The GCC should adopt the following “Smart Procurement” philosophies:
  - a. All new equipment procurements should consider the full life of the equipment (from conception to eventual disposal).
  - b. All new equipment should have growth potential (in the case of computers at least 50 percent).
  - c. All new equipment should be procured with a comprehensive support package.
  - d. Incremental acquisition should be pursued.

The author recommends that the GCC should consider the following areas for implementation in the long term (beyond 10 years):

1. The GCC should establish a Permanent Military Headquarters with associated C4I infrastructure and trained personnel.
2. The GCC should introduce Combined Staff Procedures.
3. The GCC should establish a Combined GCC Joint Command and Staff College.
4. The planned expansion of the Peninsula Shield Force into a Rapid Reaction Force is likely to cause significant manning problems. GCC member states may wish to identify national troops that are on a high state of readiness who could form the GCC Rapid Deployment Force when needed.
5. The GCC should improve its anti-submarine capability.
6. The GCC should improve its mine countermeasures capability.

WORD COUNT = 10,212



## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> The Middle East (9<sup>th</sup> edition) Congressional Quarterly, Inc.1998.p125

<sup>2</sup> Data Source-Energy Information Administration (eia) February 2001, Fact Sheet available from [www.eia.doe.gov](http://www.eia.doe.gov)

<sup>3</sup> Dr Abdallah Bishara "the gulf Co-operation council experiment; a step or an Obstacle on the road of Arab Unity." Working paper for the 2<sup>nd</sup> Annual meeting of the Public Organization for the Arab Unity Forum held in Riyadh 29/4/1985.Arab Thought Forum, Amman 1985,p.32

<sup>4</sup> Co-operation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf Secretariat General Internet Site (<http://www.gcc-sg.org/CHARTER.html>).

<sup>5</sup> Article by Rick Francona on the GCC for Suite101.com dated 27 June 2000 ([http://www.i5ive.com/article.cfm/middle\\_east/41047](http://www.i5ive.com/article.cfm/middle_east/41047)).

<sup>6</sup> Taken from remarks by US Ambassador to Kuwait on subject "The GCC and regional Security and Stability" dated 2 May 2001.

<sup>7</sup> Data Source – CIA World Fact Book 2000, GDP figures are based on 1999 (<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>).

<sup>8</sup> Abdul Jaleel Marhoon, Gulf security after the cold the War; (Dar Alnhar, Birut 1997) p153

<sup>9</sup> The new shorter Oxford English Dictionary -1993.

<sup>10</sup> Muhammad Al-Sayed Said Adris, "Gulf Security after crisis" article in the book "Gulf Security and Arab security" page 24/25.

<sup>11</sup> Data Source – The Institute for Strategic Studies "The Military Balance 1998/99".

<sup>12</sup> Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Report of the Presidential Study Group "America and the Middle East in a New Century" dated 2001 (<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/>).

<sup>13</sup> Data Source – The Institute for Strategic Studies "The Military Balance 1998/99".

<sup>14</sup> Data Source – The Institute for Strategic Studies "The Military Balance 1998/99".

<sup>15</sup> Data Source – The Institute for Strategic Studies "The Military Balance 1998/99".

<sup>16</sup> Reuters report by Tabassum Zakaria – "Cohen says Gulf early warning system not costly" dated 04/10/00 (<http://www.reuters.co.uk/>).

<sup>17</sup> Data Source – The Institute for Strategic Studies "The Military Balance 1998/99".

<sup>18</sup> Defense News "GCC Lacks Consensus on Regional Missile Shield" by Douglas Barrie and Gopal Ratnam dated 10 January 2000 (<http://www.ifpa.org/textonly/new/gcc.htm>).

<sup>19</sup> Data Source – CIA World Fact Book 2000  
(<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>).

<sup>20</sup> Joint Doctrine Staff, the Pentagon. Joint Vision 2020  
(<http://www.dtic.mil/jv2020/jvpub2.htm>).

<sup>21</sup> Interoperability – the Challenge in 2010 Prepared by Colonel S.A. Hug Deputy Chief of the Defense Staff, Canadian Armed Forces  
([http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/DGSP/analysis/challenge\\_e.asp](http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/DGSP/analysis/challenge_e.asp)).

<sup>22</sup> Swedish Defense War gaming Centre. What are Interoperability and the Requirements Thereof (<http://www.fksc.mil.se/arkiv/intere1.html>).

<sup>23</sup> British Defense Doctrine (JWP 0-01) Chapter1 Page4

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